part of an approach to epistemology that thinks of questions about knowledge, belief, and truth as being immediately tied to normative and evaluative questions. Much of the inspiration for this kind of skepticism derives from Socrates, or rather, the Socrates of Plato's dialogues. In a famous line of the Apology, Socrates says that the unexamined life is not worth living for a human being (38a5-6). Ancient skepticism inherits this spirit. It is centrally about stepping back from belief-formation and counteracting one's tendencies to be quick to judge. Closely related, it is concerned with the ways in which one can fail to understand one's own thoughts, and fail to examine thoughts because one likes or dislikes them, or because one prefers to hold a view as opposed to holding no view. These psychological phenomena are taken to differ importantly from processes of rationally guided belief-formation, where a cognizer is inclined to accept a thought after careful consideration of whether it is true.
3 After so many centuries of interpretation and adaptation of Plato, it would be naive to think that one can do justice to all arguments that have been raised from different sides. I'm self-consciously doing what I assume many in the Academy and elsewhere did -they 'did philosophy with Plato': that is, I take it, they considered Plato's dialogues extremely helpful starting points for thinking about philosophical questions that interested them; in the course of doing so, they came up with views about what Plato said, could have said, how his arguments could be developed further, and so on. 4 Insofar as the sophists also stand for an attitude of calling into question people's views relevant to the leading of their lives, they belong to the group of philosophers that interest me in this book. Cf Socrates shares a number of characteristics with the sophists. Indeed, with respect to calling into question the gods of the city, he probably is guilty as charged. Cf. Myles Burnyeat, "The Impiety of Socrates," Ancient Philosophy 17 (1997): 1-12. 5 As I see it, even Aristotle looks different if read with the skeptical tradition in mind. Aristotle's references to learning-as-recollection might appear to be ascriptions of doctrine to Plato. Read through the Socratic-skeptical lens, however, Aristotle might do what he likes to do, namely invoke and to some extent 'sharpen' theories formulated by predecessors, thereby setting out a range of theoretical options for his consideration. Aristotle is not doing history of philosophy.
though the dialogues differ in many important and interesting ways from each other, and though Plato formulates a number of theories for his and the reader's consideration, he remains committed to ongoing investigation. 6 Plato's dialogues are not treatises in disguise. 7 It is far more compelling to assume that Plato has philosophical reasons for writing dialogues, reasons that relate to Socratic caution: one should not claim or imply that one has knowledge if in fact one does not. In some of the early dialogues, confident and sometimes quite conceited interlocutors are shown to lack the expertise they claim to have. In observing their failure, one should not assume that they are on display for the amusement of readers safe from such embarrassment. Arguably, it would be pointless to write these dialogues if one thought that only others would fail in the relevant ways, while oneself was obviously in a different situation. Instead, if one takes seriously how difficult the questions under discussion are, and how deeply the views one is likely to have on them are interwoven with one's upbringing, culture, and way of life, it should be clear that anyone might fail. 8 Socratic caution involves a deliberate attempt to come up with counterarguments Katja Maria Vogt, Columbia University 9 Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato 6 Cf. Michael Frede, who argues that, even in a dialogue like the Sophist, the form of the dialogue captures a distinctively Socratic intuition -the idea that to hold forth on something presupposes a privileged position of authority. "The only person entitled to do this is one who has sorted things out in such a way that there is no confusion whatever connected in any way whatever with the question at issue." Frede takes it that Plato does not think of himself as inhabiting such a position. Accordingly, even his more positive dialogues retain the spirit of not setting oneself up as 'the one who knows.' ("The Literary Form of the Sophist," in Ch. Gill to views one might otherwise be inclined to hold. 9
Notably, not setting oneself up as an expert is entirely compatible with having certain ideas about the way things could be explained; with viewing certain proposals as worthy of repeated investigation; with thinking that one has formulated a theory that is likely to get some central points right; or with assuming that one has thought carefully through some proposals and found them to be lacking. As a result, the impression naturally arises that Plato, say, is rather strongly inclined to think that there are Forms -perhaps even that he would not give up on this view though he might be aware of major difficulties in spelling it out. And yet, another impression arises too, namely that Plato is acutely aware of such difficulties, difficulties that, though at times bracketed off, might motivate extended discussions in another dialogue. 10 That is, even where Plato appears most dogmatic -say, talking about the Forms -he is not laying out a theory. 11 In writing dialogues that return to a set of inter-related questions he keeps tackling questions left open, or questions that arise Katja Maria Vogt, Columbia University 10 Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato when a certain topic is looked at from another angle.
Plato thus has much to offer for later philosophers with skeptical inclinations. 12 It is likely that those leading figures in the Academy who became the first skeptics and those who formulated Stoic philosophy read Plato with a focus on these ideas. 13 Notably, the Stoics firmly belong into the group of the skeptically inclined. 14 One need not end up embracing skepticism in order to appreciate the force of skeptical concerns, and the Stoics' emphasis on epistemic caution is second to none. They think a state of mind is attainable where one would indeed only assent as and when one should. But this state of mind is rather hard to achieve.
As far as we know, early skeptics and Stoics thought their way through a given Katja Maria Vogt, Columbia University 11 Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato 12 Julia Annas argues that, to "show that Plato is a skeptic one would have to show that he never puts forward doctrines," which she takes to be an "implausible position." ("Plato the Skeptic," in Paul A. Vander Waerdt (ed.), The Socratic Movement, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994, 309-340, 334.) As we say, it is not clear why this should be implausible. Annas also interprets her question -"is Plato a skeptic?" -as the question of whether Arcesilaus puts forward a reading of Plato that can convince us today. However, it is unlikely that anyone today will recognize the philosophy of any philosopher in the Platonic tradition as, entirely, her take on Plato. By finding doctrines in Plato, I assume that Annas does not take herself to be committed to endorse the philosophy of any particular 'doctrinal Platonist' from antiquity. At an earlier point in her paper, Annas applies a range of criteria when asking whether Plato might be read as a skeptic, criteria such as whether Socrates always argues ad hominem; whether Plato always argues for two sides of an issue; and so on. It is a widely accepted method today to read the dialogues individually and find different arguments, methods, etc., in them. Accordingly, any such criterion is bound to produce a negative answer. 16 These are the Academic skeptics. Others thought it important to insist that knowledge, though hard to achieve, is possible. In conversation with the skeptics, these philosophers -the early Stoicstried to formulate ever more sophisticated criteria, criteria that would make sure that a given truth-claim indeed qualified as knowledge. Yet others, such as the early Pyrrhonian Aenesidemus, leave the Academy, aiming to formulate a version of skepticism that draws not only on Socratic commitment to investigation, but also on Pre-Socratic discussions about appearances. The following chapters take their content and their method from the debates between these groups of philosophers. They are a series of attempts to think through, and then to re-think, a set of Socratic intuitions. 
approaches 'wins.' 17
In other words, I shall discuss epistemological questions that are particularly salient for those ancient philosophers who devote themselves to ongoing investigation. What is their attitude towards belief? Do they take themselves to attain truths? How do they see the distinction between belief and knowledge? What kind of thought is involved in investigation? And so on. The central intuition is that the kind of truth-claim we ordinarily make is prone to be deficient: it is too quick, too strongly attached to what we would like to be the case, too much subject to a desire to be right, too changeable, and so on. This kind of truth-claim is called doxa. Doxa, then, is a deficient cognitive attitude. This idea is to be found in Plato, but also today it is standardly assumed that a cognizer who knows that p also believes that p.
The relevant ideas are not wholly foreign to contemporary epistemology. And yet, even epistemologists who explore the idea that one should only assert something if one knows it, tend to phrase this as the norm that one should not believe without knowing. 22 That is, they assume that knowing involves holding a belief. Contrary to Katja Maria Vogt, Columbia University 15 Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato 20 In the simile of the Line in Rp. VI, Plato refers to a sub-class of doxa as pistis; these are, in the Republic, beliefs about matters in the domain of shadows and reflections (the most image-like sphere of reality). Still, pistis is a kind of doxa, and shares the general characteristics of doxa. 21 The idea that knowledge is better than true belief is of course not absent from contemporary discussions. For critical discussion, cf. Ernest Sosa, "Value Matters in Epistemology," Journal of Philosophy 107.4 (2010): 167-90. However, the idea that knowledge is better than true belief is different from the idea that beliefs are generally deficient by falling short of knowledge.
22 Timothy Williamson writes about the relevant ideas: "It is plausible, nevertheless, that occurrently believing p stands to asserting p as the inner stands to the outer. If so, the knowledge rule for assertion corresponds to the norm that one should believe p only if one knows p. Given that norm, it is not reasonable to believe p when one knows that one does not know p." (Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, 255-56).
this assumption, Socratic epistemology explores the idea that, in coming to know something, knowledge that p transforms and replaces belief that p.
For the reminder of this Introduction, I shall sketch some of the relevant intuitions about doxa, in the hopes of making comprehensible the proposal that doxa is inherently deficient. To begin with, it is helpful to recall the closeness of the Greek doxa with notions of seeming, appearance, and reputation. The verb dokein means 'to appear,' and doxa thus often denotes something in the domain of appearances. Doxa can refer to appearances in a non-philosophical sense: one's reputation among other people. For example, Socrates says in the Euthyphro that shame comes with fearing the reputation -doxa -of badness (12b9-c1). Similarly, the well-known discussion in Republic I, on whether it is enough to appear just or whether one should be just, is phrased in terms of doxa. To have the doxa of justice is to have a reputation for justice. Later on in the Republic, doxa is discussed in epistemological and metaphysical terms: as a cognitive attitude that has its own kind of object. 23 
If the
Republic is read in Greek rather than translation, Book I is strikingly continuous with the metaphysics of the middle books: doxa is associated with the domain of appearance and perception, and contrasted with the domain of being. 24 The metaphysical dimension of doxa's inferiority does not survive in Hellenistic epistemology. Skeptics and Stoics do not adopt it -the skeptics, because they do not adopt any theories, and the Stoics, because they basically disagree with Platonic metaphysics. Where Plato thinks that doxa is inferior insofar as it deals with the world of becoming, the Stoics consider doxa as a state that, itself, is in change: the person with mere doxa is the person who is likely to change her mind.
Consider the following range of formulations. Someone might say "dokei moi that p"; "it seems to me that p." In some cases (though perhaps not all cases), this cognizer might be said to have engaged in the cognitive activity that the verb doxazein picks out: to form a belief, make a judgment, or perhaps, to think of something in a certain way, with thinking envisaged as inner assertoric speech. 25 And now she might be said to have a doxa. Does this final formulation still carry the implication of seeming or mere appearance? The answer must be "it depends": the word is used differently in different contexts, and philosophers theorize doxa in different ways. For current purposes it is important that, notwithstanding these differences, the ancient philosophers have the connotations of seeming-ness and appearance in mind, even if only in the back of their minds, when they discuss doxa. 26 Indeed, doxa can be seen in such a negative light that it clearly falls into the domain of ignorance. In some sense, today's philosophers might share the intuition that, where one does not have knowledge, one is ignorant. The early Greek association of doxa and ignorance runs deeper. For example, in Parmenides' poem there are but two 25 This is an conception of thought famously developed in Plato's Theaetetus 189e, and of great influence in ancient epistemology. Thinking is "speech which the mind itself goes through with itself about whatever it's considering. (…) when the mind is thinking, it's simply carrying on a discussion, asking itself questions and answering them, and making assertions and denials. And when it has come to a decision, either slowly or in a sudden rush, and it's no longer divided, but says one single thing, we call this its doxa. So what I call doxazein is speaking (legein) and what I call doxa is speech (logos); but speech spoken, not aloud to someone else, but silently to oneself."
26 When I speak of 'ancient philosophers' here, I mean to include the majority of philosophers between, say, Parmenides, and the Stoics. The history of skepticism is rather disjoint: Sextus Empiricus, an important figure, writes much later than his predecessors, and we know little about his context. I'm including him, but as an outlier. I also mean to include Aristotle, though not much will be said in this book about Aristotle. Some core ideas -doxa dealing with the domain of 'what can be otherwise' and doxa as a weak state in akrasia -are discussed in Chapter 3.
spheres: the sphere of knowledge on the one hand, and the sphere of belief-orignorance on the other. Indeed, in early Platonic dialogues it appears that there are only these two conditions: knowledge or ignorance. 27 The badness of doxa is thus, at least in some ways and in some contexts, the badness of ignorance.
In the Meno, and more explicitly in the Republic, Plato begins to work with a tripartite distinction between ignorance, doxa, and knowledge. Though it is still true that some of doxa's deficiency lies in the fact that it falls short of knowledge, more needs to be said. In particular, doxa needs to be looked at more closely because, if one wants to achieve knowledge, one must start somewhere. And where else to start than from ideas one already has? If one were to endorse one's ideas as truth-claims, one would hold doxai. If, on the other hand, one were to hypothesize them, one could use them in investigation without tainting one's state of mind with an inferior kind of cognitive attitude. Before one begins to investigate, however, one is likely to hold beliefs.
Acquisition of knowledge, then, would seem to involve that one moves from having beliefs -states to be gotten rid of -to having knowledge.
In order to see more clearly the idea that knowledge replaces belief, recall a wellknown passage from the Meno. Socrates teaches a young slave, who had no previous training, some geometry; eventually the boy arrives at the right answer to a geometrical problem. As Socrates puts it, the slave boy now formulated a correct belief. For the belief to become a piece of knowledge, he would have to repeat this Katja Maria Vogt, Columbia University 18 Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato and similar exercises. Eventually, the belief would settle down in his mind. It would become a piece of knowledge. That is, contrary to the long-standing idea that something must be added to true belief for it to become knowledge -say, a justification -this line of thought suggests that, once the true belief has become stable (which might involve that the relevant reasoning is in place), a piece of knowledge replaces what was earlier a true belief. 28 This stable attitude, so the proposal goes, is genuinely different. And that is, it is not the case that one attitude changed a property, becoming stable. Through stabilization, a new attitude -knowledge -is generated.
The passage in the Meno is short, and its interpretation is controversial. For present purposes, it suffices that the passage can be interpreted in this fashion. It is possible to read the text as suggesting that the formerly-held belief comes to be replaced by a piece of knowledge. This idea is central to the tradition of Socratic epistemology:
belief is an inherently deficient attitude. In moving from belief to knowledge, one does not add something to an attitude that one otherwise keeps in place -no, one comes to have a different attitude altogether. 'saw all things' prior to its birth in a human body. The slave boy can formulate the correct answer because knowledge is already present in his soul. Learning is recollecting: it can be hard to access latent knowledge, because it is buried under false conceptions, which first need to be cleared away. This is a forceful story, and it merits being re-told. Notably, however -and this is what any skeptical or Stoic reader would emphasize -it is not presented as a theory, supported by arguments. It is something priests and priestesses say. Presumably, if people who are close to divinity put forward an idea, we should take it seriously. But it is one thing to take it seriously, and another thing for it to be literally true. 29 Like the Republic's similes, reference to the views of priests is a cousin of hypothetical investigation: a certain view can be considered, and yet it is not claimed that it can be accounted for and presented as knowledge.
In the Meno, three solutions to the puzzle of how investigation is possible are on offer.
First, recollection: it is possible to investigate a matter because we know and do not know it at the same time when we begin to investigate; we know it latently, but not overtly (81a-d). Second comes a distinctively Socratic idea, namely that, even though we do not know whether recollection is true, we should continue to investigate, because otherwise we would become lazy people (81d-e). Third, and after the geometry example (81e-85b), comes the proposal that we need a distinction between Katja Maria Vogt, Columbia University 20 Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato 29 David Sedley and Alex Long divide the text up such that only 81a-c are attributed to priests and priestesses, and 81c-e appears as "epistemological doctrine" put forward in Socrates' own voice (Plato. Meno and Phaedo, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, xvii). From the perspective of the skeptic reading I put forward, there is no such transition; 81c-e continues to talk about Hades, the soul, and so forth. Indeed, Sedley and Long immediately go on to admit that "the only conclusion Socrates will absolutely insist on" is that one should seek because, to give up on it based on the Meno Problem is to be lazy. true belief and knowledge. It is possible to investigate because the dichotomy of either knowing or not knowing something, which was a premise of the Meno Problem, is compatible with a tripartite distinction between ignorance, belief, and knowledge. It is possible to have beliefs about things that one does not know.
In fairness to those interpreters who focus on Recollection rather than this last move, it must be admitted that the threefold distinction between ignorance, doxa, and knowledge, is not explicitly argued for. Instead, doxa sneaks in via the route I sketched above -through formulations that employ the verb dokein. In a famous line, Socrates formulates a principle for question and answer: say what you think. You, Socrates says to the slave boy, should respond by saying what seems to you (soi dokoun) (83d4). He goes on to tell Meno that he will only want to hear the boy's doxai (84d3) and eventually states that the boy formulated no doxa that was not his own (85b12). The doxai he came up with were in him (c4). The person who is ignorant still has correct doxai (c6-7). For current purposes, we can break off here.
The point has been made that, though someone is ignorant of something, she is not entirely ignorant in such a way as to have no views on the matter. And that was the initial assumption in the Meno Problem, that one either is ignorant in such a way as to have no starting-point for thinking about something, or one already has knowledge.
The problem, it turns out, was formulated in a misleading way. The ignorant person has something at her disposal that allows her to start thinking about things.
A deflationary reading of the Meno focuses on this: investigation is possible because we have beliefs about the things that we do not know. As unendorsed hypotheses, these attitudes are respectable starting-points for investigation. This is how skeptics, who want to investigate without doxai, are likely to read the Meno. 30 Right after discussion of the Meno Problem, Socrates introduces a so-called hypothetical method.
And that is, he introduces something of enormous interest to skeptics: an attitude that falls short of truth-claims and that nevertheless allows an investigator to engage with her thoughts and the thoughts of others.
And yet, one may want to defend Recollection. Recollection aims to capture, apart from explaining how investigation is possible, the following phenomenon: a learner might, in a certain sense, already have available to herself the content that she is in the process of learning. 31 As part of the deflationary reading, this phenomenon gets reexplained, without reference to an earlier life of the mind. As Hellenistic philosophers suggest, a reasoner has content available through the concepts that were acquired early on in this life. The having of these concepts, called pre-conceptions, actually makes her a reasoner. Hellenistic readers of the Meno are likely to point out that
Socrates asks first of all whether the slave-boy knows Greek. As a knower of Greek, the slave boy has some kind of understanding of what Socrates says when he says "let's draw a square." In the terms of Hellenistic philosophers, he has a preconception -some preliminary idea of what squares are. Preconceptions need to be made explicit in investigation, and they need to be developed further. Still, there is a sense in which has the lesser status of ignorance or belief. Insofar as the Theaetetus takes seriously the option that doxa might simply be judgment, rather than a deficient kind of truthclaim, it discusses ideas that are close to today's notion of belief. 35 This idea from the Theaetetus is an ancestor of the framework of Stoic philosophy of mind, according to which every cognitive activity involves acceptance of (rejection of, or suspension of judgment with respect to) a given impression. The normative question of how these acceptances fare, and whether they qualify as knowledge, is considered a separate question, one that is turned to after the basic structure of cognitive operations has been described.
In Plato, the notion of belief-as-truth-claim competes with the Socratic intuition that beliefs are a particular kind of truth-claim, namely deficient truth-claims. This competing conception immediately includes a normative perspective. Arguably, it is the nature of belief that, when we form a belief, we aim to accept as true what really is true. 36 A cognizer might fail, and accept something as true that is not true. Moreover, and this is a point of particular relevance for Socratic epistemology, cognizers can fail to properly aim at the truth in forming beliefs. 37 They might 'jump to conclusions,' or in some other way accept something as true without having considered it carefully. true what in one way or another feels good. Fifth, they tend not to be aware of the fact that they might not be acquainted with relevant concepts, thus buying into ideas that they hardly comprehend. Sixth, they display a propensity for belief-formation as opposed to abstention from belief-formation.
Consider an example, the priest Euthyphro, Socrates' interlocutor in the dialogue Euthyphro. Euthyphro is presented as someone who sees himself (and is seen by the city) as an expert in matters of piety and justice. As a consequence, he is brazenly confident in his own legal judgment, though it concerns a complicated case -a case that could either be intentional murder or mere negligence (2a-5d). The thought that he might misjudge the facts does not cross his mind; instead, he compares himself to Zeus (6a). When Socrates calls his views into question, and he no longer knows how to defend them, he leaves (15d-e). Clearly, he is not going to revise any of his judgments in the light of arguments. In the course of the conversation, Euthyphro accepts a number of premises without having given them due consideration. In particular, he accepts ideas that sound good to him, for example, ideas that vaguely fit his notion that the gods are amazing and incomprehensible (6b-c). Throughout the conversation, Euthyphro never says "I don't know" or "I don't understand," even when Socrates formulates ideas that are obviously beyond him, and that involve semitechnical vocabulary. For example, in a famous passage, Socrates asks Euthyphro whether everything that is pious has the same idea (5d, 6d-e) and is pious through the same eidos (6d), using the Greek terms that eventually become central to Plato's thought about the Forms. 42 Euthyphro quickly says "yes." A more careful interlocutor would have said that she neither knows how to understand the locution 'through' in Socrates' proposal, nor what idea and eidos, both words with wide-ranging nontechnical uses, precisely mean here. Euthyphro is unaware of such issues, and he prefers to take a stance.
Euthyphro is exemplary in displaying tendencies of the mind that Socrates battles against. A willingness to gloss over what one does not comprehend; an inclination to accept as true what one is in no position to judge; inflated confidence in one's judgment, nourished by self-aggrandizing claims; and a preference for ideas that feel Katja Maria Vogt, Columbia University 28 Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato lovely ("the gods are amazing!") as opposed to less pleasurable, but more realistic ideas ("I have no idea what the gods are"). In sum, the Socratic proposal is that it is not a fact about human faculties that in forming beliefs cognizers aim at representing the world as it is. Instead, they often aim at feel-good beliefs and at seeing themselves in a positive light. 43 Aiming at the truth, accordingly, is a hard task. It is difficult to comply with the fundamental norm of belief-formation, namely, to aim to form beliefs that represent the world as it is. Depending on how this norm is interpreted, adhering to it might imply that one holds back from forming beliefs pretty much all the time.
Alternatively, adherence to this norm might imply that one takes seriously criteria of truth -criteria that are taken to indicate that a given thought indeed represents things as they are. One way or another, it is clear that, as compared to widespread habits of belief-formation, the Socratic perspective is likely to call for less judgment, sloweddown judgment, and more cautious judgment.
Against this Socratic perspective, one could argue that it is often better to form a belief as opposed to not forming a belief. This kind of objection can be raised from Katja Maria Vogt, Columbia University 29 Belief and Truth: A Skeptic Reading of Plato 43 In the language of contemporary discussions, the behavior of Socrates' interlocutors could be described as 'data' that are to be explained, data that are relevantly similar to the findings of some recent empirical research. For example, studies about 'moral dumbfounding' look at the ways in which people who find themselves unable to support their moral views in the face of critical argument nevertheless hold on to their views. Cf. Haidt, Murphy, Bjorklund, (2000) "Moral Dumbfounding: when intuitions find no reasons" (2000) Unpublished, available online (as of November 2010): http:// faculty.virginia.edu/haidtlab/articles/manuscripts/ haidt.bjorklund.working-paper.when%20intuition %20finds%20no%20reason.pub603.doc. several perspectives. 44 For example, one might think that, in many situations, one is better off holding a belief, even if the risk that it might be false cannot be ruled out. 45 Moreover, certain situations might call on agents to take a stand, so that abstaining out of cautiousness involves a moral failure. Relatedly, one might think there is some virtue in holding on to an intuition, even if one cannot find proof. Presumably, this tension is made vivid in Plato's Phaedo, where it seems that Socrates is unwilling to give up on his view that the soul is immortal, even though it remains unclear whether any of the arguments to that effect is conclusive. 46 Similar points are raised within the ancient Socratic tradition, in particular, against the Pyrrhonian skeptics, who are perceived as arguing for extreme epistemic norms, favoring the avoidance of deficient judgment over any other epistemic aim. These objections fuel a famous anti-skeptical argument, the so-called Apraxia Charge. The charge comes in a number of versions, including one according to which the skeptics cannot survive, one according to which they cannot act in any robust sense of 'action,' and one according to which they cannot adhere to any kind of ethical values. 47 As I hope to show throughout the book, the intuitions on the side of Socratic caution are strong. This does not mean that critics who point to the role of belief in action, or to the moral importance of taking a stance, refer to issues of little significance. On the contrary, much of the argument that Socratically inspired epistemologists must provide is that more or less distant relatives of belief -hypotheses, 'seemings,' assumptions, and the like -can fulfill the functions that are greatly relevant. Notably, the skeptics and Stoics do not speak loosely of belief, as if assumptions or suppositions were kinds of belief. It is important to them to draw a distinction between the attitude of belief on the one hand, and attitudes that involve some distancing or open-mindedness. 48 The Pyrrhonian skeptics -the skeptics to whom I shall refer as skeptics, because their philosophy is central to this book -develop sophisticated methods of staying away from beliefs. In particular, they employ so-called modes of arguments when they investigate philosophical questions. Contemporary scholars have complained that someone who employs such modes, thereby regularly arriving at suspension of judgment, cannot seriously call herself an 'investigator' (skeptikos), as the skeptics do. The skeptics, they argue, aim at suspension of judgment, not at truth. This charge was not raised among the contemporary critics of the skeptics, who were otherwise vocal and imaginative critics of skeptical philosophy, able to detect many potential weaknesses. As I suspect, it was not raised because prominent interlocutors of the ancient skeptics shared with them Socratic premises about a life devoted to investigation. The value of truth has two sides: it is valuable to attain truths, and valuable to avoid the acceptance of falsehoods. The value of truth can thus be responded to in several ways, depending on how one construes the relationship between these two aims. If one shares the Socratic intuition that it is paramount to avoid the acceptance of falsehoods, and that it is preferable to make no truth-claims as opposed to false ones, then skeptical investigation might be the most convincing response.
